This paper analyzes retirement timing decisions of DC pension plan members.
I Introduction
In recent years, there has been a signi…cant shift from De…ned Bene…t (DB) to De…ned Contribution (DC) pension plans in a number of countries, including the U.S., the U.K. and Australia. In the U.S., the number of DB plans has declined sharply in recent years, from 112,208 in 1985 112,208 in to about 29,600 in 2004 112,208 in (FDIC 2006 . In the U.K., DC plans started widely about two decades ago. At 2002, approximately a third of pension schemes in the U.K. are DC and the trend away from DB funds is expected to accelerate in coming years (Ross and Wills 2002) . This shift makes it increasingly interesting to understand determinants of DC pension plan participants'retirement decisions.
Retirement decisions of individuals with DC plans are in ‡uenced jointly by many factors, for example, expected and realized investment returns, the individuals'risk aversion, the mortality rate, the subjective valuation of leisure, the labor income and its expected growth rate. DC pension plans generally provide bene…t in the form of a lump-sum payment. In some countries, for example, the U.S., there are no obligations to annuitize DC wealth, while in others, for example, the U.K., there are obligations to do so. The seminal paper of Yaari (1965) argues that, in the absence of bequest motive, all retirement wealth should be annuitized. There are two reasons supporting this view. One is that without annuitization there is a risk that the retirees might consume too much so that they will exhaust their retirement resource before they die. The other one is that some retirees might consume too less while they are alive. These individuals could have consumed more to have better life quality. Thus, an important part of annual DC pension income should be annuity income, especially in the countries, like the U.K., where there are obligations to annuitize DC wealth.
In reality, individuals with DC plans do not have to annuitize their DC wealth immediately after retirement. The freedom in choosing the annuitization time allows the individuals to bene…t from better …nancial market performance after retirement. Therefore it should have a large impact on the retirement timing. Without this freedom, it would be better for the individuals to retire when the …nancial market performance is favorable. However, with this freedom, the individuals does not have to wait for the good …nancial market performance. It could be optimal for the individuals to retire even when the …nancial market performance is sluggish because they could continue investing their DC wealth in the …nancial market after retirement and annuitize the DC wealth when the market performs better. The decision to retire is actually a decision to exercise a compound real option optimally. Once the individual retires, he gets the option to annuitize his pension wealth. The optimal retirement decision depends on the expected outcome of the annuitization option. This paper aims to analyze retirement timing decisions of DC pension plan participants, taking into account the optimal annuitization timing decision. To do so, I will …rst set up a retirement decision model and develop a forward looking retirement likelihood measure from this model. The retirement likelihood measure describes the probability that an individual will retire within the next few years. In the model, the individual obtains utility from leisure, labor income before retirement and pension bene…t after retirement. The DC pension bene…t is the income from the annuity which is bought at the optimal annuitization timing. The retirement likelihood measure is then tested with the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) data. The most important reason why I choose U.K. data is that there is an obligation to annuitize pension wealth before age 75. ELSA is a biannual panel survey among those aged 50 and over (and their younger partners) living in private households in England. For all the individuals who are full-time employed in the wave 1 interviews (conducted in 2002-3) , the probabilities of retiring by wave 2 interviews (conducted in 2004-5) are evaluated based only on the information available at wave 1 interviews. The model predictions are compared with the actual retirement ratios and the predictions implied by a Probit model where age, gender, education level and DC wealth are explanatory variables used to explain the retirement decisions reported at the wave 2 interviews. The performance of the retirement likelihood measure, in terms of the correlations with the actual retirement ratios and the Mean Square Errors, are comparable to the performance of the Probit regression. This result gives strong support to the option model setup in this paper because the prediction from the option model is out of sample while the prediction from the Probit regression is in sample. This paper is related to the literature focusing on the determinants of retirement decision. The …rst line of research in this area has investigated the retirement incentives of DB pension plan participants. The seminal paper by Stock and Wise (1990) presented an option value model to describe the retirement decision of DB plan participants. Their model is very close in spirit to the stochastic dynamic programming model of Rust (1987) . Stock and Wise (1990) applied their model to data from a large company. They found that their model could explain very well the actual retirement ratios in that company. They argue that pension wealth is a signi…cant determinant of the retirement probability. Samwick (1998) applied the option model to a national-wide dataset. His research con…rmed and strengthened the results of Stock and Wise (1990) . Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) linked the option value to the lifetime marginal productivity schedule which, given their assumption, is increasing at the beginning of the working life and then starts decreasing. They argue that people will retire when the ratio of DB pension bene…t and the current wage reaches certain threshold value. This paper extends the option value model of Stock and Wise (1990) to the DC plan participants'retirement decision.
The second line of research focuses on di¤erences between impacts of DB and DC pension plans on the retirement decision and pension income. Friedberg and Webb (2005) studied the Health and Retirement Survey data and found that workers with DC plans are retiring signi…cantly later compared with the ones with DB scheme. Samwick and Skinner (1998) investigated whether DC plans, compared to DB plans, are adequate in providing for a comfortable retirement pension. Their results show that DC plans can strengthen the …nancial security of the retirees.
The third line of research looks at the interactions among wealth, investment strategies and the retirement decision. Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) and Coronado and Perozek (2003) studied the e¤ect of a positive shock in household wealth including private savings and savings through DC accounts on household members' retirement decision making. These two papers investigated the period in the late 1990s when the stock market was booming in the U.S.. Both papers found that the extraordinary high returns in the stock market increased retirement in the United States. Lachance (2003) , Choi and Shim (2006) , Farhi and Panageas (2007) and Liu and Neis (2002) studied the issue of retirement decision and its implication on the investment choice. Choi and Shim (2006) show that the individual consumes less and invests more in risky assets when he has an option to retire than he should in the absence of such an option. Farhi and Penagear (2007) …nd that investing for early retirement tends to increase savings and reduce an agent's e¤ective relative risk aversion, thus increasing his stock market exposure. This paper is also related to the literature on optimal annuitization timing. The literature in this topic is relatively small but growing. Milevsky and Young (2002) developed a normative model of when the individuals should annuitize their wealth. Their model was built on Merton (1971) and solved by the standard continuous-time technology. Milevsky and Young (2007) argued that in the US annuitization prior to age 65-70 was not optimal even in the absence of any bequest motives.
The main contribution of this paper is to incorporate the optimal annuitization timing decision into a normative model explaining the optimal retirement decision making of DC plan participants. There is no doubt that the annuitization timing has large impact on the size of the DC pension bene…t. Therefore, rational individuals with DC plans should take this into account while making their retirement decision. Incorporating the optimal annuitization decision making improves the comprehensiveness of a normative model for optimal retirement timing decision. The empirical …ndings of this paper suggest that in reality at least some individuals recognize the value of the freedom in choosing the annuitization timing and incorporate it into their retirement decision making.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the British pension system. Section 3 describes the option value model. Second 4 presents the solution method to the model. Second 5 discusses the empirical investigation of the model prediction. Section 6 concludes.
II The British Pension System
The U.K. pension system consists of three main pillars. The …rst pillar, known as Basic State Pension (BSP), is a mandatory, ‡at rate state pension 1 . The second pillar system is provided by the state, employers and private sector …nancial institutions. In the second pillar, the employees have considerable choices over the type of pension that they can accumulate. The main choices are between: (1) an earnings-related state pension plan 2 ;
(2) an occupational DB plan provided by employers and (3) an occupational DC pension plan. The state pension plan o¤ers a pension that is low relative to average earnings, but is fully indexed to prices after retirement. The occupational DB plan o¤ers a relatively high level of pension to the employees who spend most of their working time with the same employer, but provides poor transfer values between plans on changing jobs. The occupational DC pension plan is fully portable, but the pension income depends on uncertain investment returns (see Blake 2003) . The second pillar state pension is by default compulsory to all the employees who earn above a lower threshold set by the state. But individuals are able to contract out of the second pillar state pension into an occupational pension scheme provided that the latter is at least as generous as the second-pillar state pension. The third pillar consists of voluntary private pension plans 3 .
The third pillar pension arrangements are usually of DC type.
1 The BSP is funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. It is a ‡at rate bene…t. Individuals are entitled to at least some part of the BSP if they have made National Insurance (NI) contributions for at least 25% of their working lives. The BSP bene…t in 2006/7 is about £ 85 per week (Department of Work and Pensions). This bene…t is indexed to in ‡ation (Clark and Emmerson 2003) . 2 The second pillar state pension plan was called State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and replaced by State Second Pension (S2P) in 2002. The second pillar state pension plans are of DB nature (Cocco and Lopes 2004) . Both the …rst and second pillar state pensions are paid by the Department of Pension and Working once the retiree reaches his State Pension Age (SPA). Currently the State Pension Age is 65 for men and 60 for women. By 2020, the SPA for woman will increase gradually to 65.
3 Employers and individuals can also make additional contributions to a private pension. The state supports the savings in private pension plans through tax relief (see Clark and Emmerson 2003). In the U.K., the DC plan participants do not have to annuitize their DC wealth immediately at the retirement date. Up to one-quarter of the value of a pension fund can be taken as a lump sum, but three-quarters must be annuitized before the age of 75 (Finance Act 1995). The obligation to annuitize DC wealth and the freedom in choosing the annuitization time are the most important reasons why U.K. data is selected for the empirical investigation in this paper.
III The Model
The aim of this section is to model the optimal retirement decision of an individual participating in a DC plan, taking into account the optimal annuitization timing. This model will also account for the DB and the state pension plans existing next to the DC pension plan. Currently, we are at time 0 and the individual's current age is F , where 50 F < 75: He is working full time at time 0. He can retire between time 1, 2; 3; :::and time T where time T is the time when this person turns 75 years old. The oldest age the individual could reach is assumed to be T max and T max > T: His current DC wealth is W 0 : The individual does not have to annuitize his retirement wealth immediately after retirement unless he retires at time T: If he retires before time T; he could annuitize his pension wealth between the retirement date, say t; and T:
Assume that the individual retires at time t; where t could be any time between 1 and T and annuitizes at time t a , which could be either at or between time t and T: His subsequent pension income, P (t; t a ) ; consists of annuity income, A (t; t a ) ; after the individual annuitizes his DC wealth, the amount, Q (t; t a ) ; withdrawn from his DC wealth before annuitization, the income from current and past DB plans, CDB (t) and P DB (t) ; and the state pension, SP (t) ; that is,
where
For any given pairs of t and t a ; Q (t; t a ) is constant over time (t; t a ) and A (t; t a ) is constant over time (t a ; T ). The DB and state pension bene…ts, CDB (t) j ; P DB (t) j and SP (t) j ; are indexed to in ‡ation after retirement. The pension bene…ts, A (t; t a ) ; Q (t; t a ) ; CDB (t) ; P DB (t) and SP (t) will be discussed below in more detail.
The Financial Market
In this section, the asset universe available to the DC pension plan member for investment purposes will be introduced. There are one stock index and one bond index available in the …nancial market. The di¤usion processes of the short term interest rate and the stock index are as follows,
where s is the Sharpe Ratio of stock price, and ; r ; r; r , s ; s are constants.
Z 1 and Z 2 are two independent standard Brownian Motions supported by a probability space ( ; F; P ) over the …nite time horizon (0; T ) : All stochastic processes introduced in this paper are assumed to be measurable with respect to the augmented …ltration
From the Vasicek model, we can get the price of the zero-coupon bond at time t with time to maturity h
and r is the interest rate price of risk. The yield of a zero-coupon bond with time to maturity h; Y (h) ; is
By Ito's lemma, the dynamics of any arbitrary bond prices can be described by
where B;t = r D (r; t) and D (r; t) = dBt dr 1 Bt is the elasticity of the bond price with respect to the short interest rate. The elasticity is referred to as the duration of the interest rate contingent claim. Following Munk, et al (2003) , it is assumed that the bond available for the investor has a constant duration D > 0. This can be thought of as re ‡ecting the duration of the aggregate portfolio of bonds outstanding, or a bond index, where bonds that expire are always substituted with new longer term bonds.
The DC Income
As we have seen before, the DC income, DC (t; t a ) ; consists of the amount the individual withdraw before annuitization, Q (t; t a ) ; and annuity income after the annuitization, A (t; t a ). The DC income is jointly a¤ected among other factors by the investment returns, the amount of contributions made to the DC plan and the annuity rates.
Let W (t; t a ) j denote the individual's DC portfolio wealth at time j, j 2 [t; t a ] ; if the individual retires at time t and annuitizes at time t a : Assume that the total amount of contributions paid by the individual and his employer to the DC plan is C per year. After retirement, the individual will withdraw Q (t; t a ) per year from his DC wealth before annuitization. A fraction of his DC assets is invested in the stock index and 1 in the bond index. As in Samwick and Skinner (2003) , the investment portfolio will be rebalanced annually to keep the weight of the stock and bond at and 1 . The optimal annuitization and retirement dates will be described below. For every possible combination of retirement and annuitization dates, that is, 0 t T and t t a T; the individual's DC wealth can be described as follows
(W(t;ta) j 1 +C)
(W(t;ta) j 1 Q(t;ta))
(7) The upper part of equation (7) describes the wealth process before retirement and the lower part describes the wealth process after retirement. Before the individual retires, the total amount of DC wealth available for investing is the sum of the previous DC wealth and the new contribution. After the individual retires but before the individual annuitizes his DC wealth, the total amount of DC wealth available for investing is the di¤erence between the previous DC wealth and the amount withdrawn by the individual.
If the individual retires at time t and annuitizes his DC wealth at time t a ; the annuity income, A (t; t a ) ; which he will receive immediately after annuitization until he dies depends, among others, on the term structure and the amount of DC wealth at the annuitization date, t a : A (t; t a ) is determined as follows,
In eq. (8), p is a load factor which is greater than or equal to zero, obtaining a measure of the "money's worth"of the annuity. If the load factor is zero, then the annuity contract is actuarially fair and the "money's worth" equals one. Empirical evidence by Mitchell et. al. (1999) illustrates that the load factor varies between 8% and 20% depending on di¤erent assumptions about discounting and mortality tables. M k denote the probability that the individual is alive at time k, conditional on being alive at time k-1 and M 1 1:
ta is the j-year interest rate at the time of annuitization.
I assume that the amount, Q (t; t a ) ; the individual withdraws after retirement but before annuitization equals the amount of annuity income he could get if he annuitizes immediately after retirement, that is,
The DB and state pension incomes are introduced in the following part of this section.
The DB and State Pension Income
If the person retires at time t, where t could be any time between 1 and T , his income from current and past DB plans, CDB (t) and P DB (t) ; are determined by, among others, the accrual rate, years of membership and labor income, that is,
P DB (t) = acc_rate n past Y lastyear exp ( (t t lastyear )) ; with t lastyear < t; (10) where acc_rate is the accrual rate, n t is the number of membership years in the current DB scheme at time t, n past is the number of years in the past DB scheme, is the annual in ‡ation rate, t lastyear is the last year in the past DB plan, Y lastyear is the individual's annual gross income during his last year in the past scheme and Y t is the person's annual gross income at time t. Thus, the DB plan is of a …nal salary type and the DB income after retirement is indexed to in ‡ation which is required by law in the U.K. (see Blake 2003) . This means if the individual retires at time t; his income afterwards is, CDB (t) j = CDB (t) exp ( (j t)) ; for j = t:::T max ; P DB (t) j = P DB (t) exp ( (j t)) ; for j = t:::T max :
The state pension is also indexed to in ‡ation, therefore, we have
The Objective Function
The utility function is closely related to Stock and Wise (1990) . At time 0, the individual is full time employed. The individual can retire between time 1 and T: Looking ahead, he will receive his labor income as long as he keeps working. Once he retires he receives pension income and enjoys the leisure until he dies. At time t; 1 t T; if the individual retires, his utility of retirement, U t ; is the sum of the utility from labor income, pension bene…t and leisure, that is,
where stands for the subjective discount factor and the parameter K takes into account the disutility of work. Y s stands for labor income which is deterministic and P (t; t a ) s is the pension income which is explained in (1).
M k is the cumulative survival probability from time t to s with M t = 1: The …rst term of (12) is the accumulation of the utility from labor income at time t and the second term is the sum of the discounted utility from pension and leisure at time t: As in Stock and Wise (1990) , the parameter K has two speci…cations. In the …rst speci…cation, K is a constant. In the second speci…cation, K is a convex function of current age, F; and
where k 0 ; k 1 and k 2 are constants. Note that the amount of utility gain from leisure is increasing with the DC wealth level.
To adjust for the wealth e¤ect, K is set to be k 3 k 0
for the individuals with very large DC wealth, where 0 < k 3 < 1:
For each of the possible retirement stopping times, the DB and state pension income is determined by (9), (10) and (11). But as we have seen in Section 3.2, the DC pension income, DC (t; t a ) ; depends not only on when the individual retires but also on when DC wealth is annuitized. This makes the retirement option a compounded real option. Once the individual retires, he obtains the right to exercise his annuitization option. But the retirement decision depends on the expected outcome of the annuitization option. Therefore, in order to …nd a solution to (12), we …rst have to …nd the optimal annuitization timing and thus, the optimal DC pension income, P (t; t a ) ; for all the possible retirement times from year 1; 2; 3 to year T: After that, we could attempt to solve for the optimal retirement timing for eq.(12).
The retirement timing decision is an example of optimal stopping problems with …xed horizon. The optimal stopping problem describes the problem of choosing a time to stop a certain action based on sequentially observed random variables in order to maximize the expected payo¤ or utility. A random variable de…ned on and taking values in the time set is called a stopping time if the event f tg belongs to F t for all t 2 (1; T ) : In other words, for ; to be a stopping time, it should be possible to decide whether or not the event f tg has occurred based on the knowledge that are known at time t, i.e., the knowledge in the information set F t : The stopping time for retirement decisions is called retirement stopping time. The retirement problem can be formulated as …nding an optimal retirement stopping time, r ; from all retirement stopping times, r ; with values in (1; T ) ;that maximizes the expected discounted utility of retirement at time 1, i.e.,
M k is the cumulative surviving probability from time 1 to r with M 1 = 1:
The annuitization timing decision is also an example of optimal stopping problems with …xed horizon. The stopping time for annuitization decisions is called annuitization stopping time. The annuitization time, a ; must be between retirement time and the deadline for annuitization, that is, a 2 ( r ; T ) : The optimal annuitization stopping timing, a ; is the stopping time that maximizes the expected discounted utility of pension income at retirement time r ; with r 2 (1; T ) ; that is,
and the product, exp( ( a r )) B ( r ; a ), is the sum of the discounted utility of pension income at retirement time r :
Summary of Section 3
In this section, a theoretical model was set up to explain the retirement decision of an individual with DC pension plan. In the model, the individual obtains utility from labor income, pension bene…t and leisure. The annuitization time could be later than the retirement time. The DC pension bene…t depends not only on the …nancial market performance but also on the annuitization timing. In order to …nd the optimal retirement timing, we …rst have to …nd the optimal annuitization stopping time for all the possible retirement times and then, we can use the dynamic programming principle to …nd the optimal retirement time. The detailed solution to the model will be discussed in Section 4.
IV The Solution Method
The optimal annuitization and retirement decisions are very similar to the decision of exercising an American option optimally, in the sense that, like the American option, both the retirement and annuitization decisions can be made at any stopping time between the "purchase" date, in our cases, the time when the individual is allowed to retire/annuitize, and the "expiration" date, in our cases, the time when the individual turns 75 years old.
Let n be the "purchase" date of an annuitization option or a retirement option. The optimal annuitization and retirement stopping problems can be stated as
where the function
annuitization option, n = 1 for the retirement option and n = r for the annuitization option.
The standard solution to a optimal stopping problem with …nite horizon is to follow the dynamic programming principle (c.f. Peskir and Shiryaev 2006) . Let J t be the highest attainable expected utility at time t the individual can achieve if he exercises his option at or later than time t, that is,
Here exercising an option means retiring for the retirement option and annuitizing for the annuitization option. At time t = T , the individual has to stop immediately and gains J T = Z T : At time t = T t; where t stands for very short period of time, he can either stop or continue. If he stops, = t and J T t equals to Z T t , and if he continues, = T and J T t equals to exp ( t) E (J T jF T t ) : It follows that if Z T t exp ( t) E (J T jF T t ) then he needs to stop at time t = T t; otherwise, he needs to continue at time t = T t: This decision rule re ‡ects the fact that the individual's decision about stopping or continuation at time t = T t must be based on the information contained in F T t only. For t = T 2 t; :::; n; the considerations are continued analogously.
The method of backward induction just explained leads to a sequence of random variables, (J t ) n t T ; de…ned recursively as follows:
t) E (J t+ t jF t )) for t = T t; :::n:
The method also suggests that we consider the following stopping time
as a candidate for optimal stopping time for problem (15). Peskir and Shiryaev (2006) proved that n is indeed the optimal stopping time in (15). The proof is provided in Appendix A.
At time t; t < T; the value of immediate exercise, Z t ; is known to the individual. But the value of exp ( t) E (J t+ t jF t ) is still unknown. The key to solve the optimal stopping problem (15) is therefore, to evaluate the conditional expectations,
exp (
t) E (J t+ t jF t ) for t = T t; :::n: Least Square Monte Carlo (LSM) valuation algorithm developed by Longsta¤ and Schwartz (2001) is adopted to approximate E (J t+ t jF t ) and to solve optimal stopping problem numerically.
The Least Square Monte Carlo (LSM) Algorithm
The objective of the LSM algorithm is to provide a pathwise approximation to the optimal stopping rules. It is assumed that the option can only be exercised and considered at a …nite number of discrete times, n; :::; t; t + t; :::T . For each exercise date, n; :::T; N paths (scenarios) of stock prices and short-term interest rates are simulated.
The LSM algorithm follows the standard backward induction method as described previously. At the …nal expiration date, T; the option has to be exercised, the individual gets Z T;i ; where i stands for a simulated path and i = 1; 2; :::N: At exercise dates before the …nal expiration date, say time t; the individual must choose whether to exercise the option immediately or to keep the option alive and make the exercise decision at the next exercise date. At time t, for any path i; where the utility from immediate exercise, Z t;i ; is larger than or equal to the expected utility of continuation conditional on the information available at time t and path i, exp ( t) E (J t+ t jF t;i ) ; it is optimal to exercise the option. For any paths where the opposite holds, it is optimal to wait. At time t and path i; the value of immediate exercise, Z t;i ; is known to the individual but the value of waiting, E (J t+ t jF t;i ) ; is unknown. Note that the utility functions for retirement and annuitization are functions of two stochastic variables, the stock price, S t ; and the short-term interest rate, r t : Let S t = (S t;1 ; S t;2; :::S t;N ) 0 , r t = (r t;1 ; r t;2; :::r t;N ) 0 , X t = [S t ; r t ] and t = n; :::; T: Because (X t ) t=n;:::T are (F t ) Markov chains, for t = n; :::T;
we have E (J t+ t jF t ) = E (J t+1 jX t ), which allows us to use X t to estimate the value of E (J t+ t jF t ) : The conditional expectation at time t and path i; ( t) E (J t+ t jX t;i ) ; is approximated by regressing the vector of discounted value of continuation at time t, exp ( t) J t+ t ; where J t+ t = (J t+ t;1 ; J t+ t;2 ; :::J t+ t;N ) 0 , on the simulated paths of a set of basis functions of relevant state variables at time t, f k (X t ) where 1 k m, m denotes the number of basic functions, and f k ( )'s are measurable real valued functions of 
Clément, Lamberton and Protter (2002) analyzed the convergence properties of the LSM algorithm. They proved the strong convergence ofÊ m (J t+ t jX t ) towards E (J t+ t jF t ) : A brief discussion of the proof is provided in Appendix B. The result of Clément, Lamberton and Protter (2002) is con…rmed by Eglo¤ (2005) and Moreno and Navas (2003) .
The individual will decide at time t whether to exercise the option or not. For the paths where the value of immediate exercise, Z t;i ; is larger (smaller) than or equal to the estimated conditional expectation, exp ( t)Ê m (J t+ t jX t;i ) ; it is optimal to exercise the option (wait). Proceed these calculations and comparisons recursively backwards until the "purchase" date is reached. The optimal stopping time for each path is then decided by starting from the "purchase" date, moving along each path until the …rst stopping time. For each path, the …rst stopping time is the optimal exercise time for that path. Thus, there will be one and only one optimal stopping time for each path.
The Retirement Likelihood Measure
Currently we are at time 0; the stock price and interest rate at time 0 are known but the future prices are unknown. For each of the exercise dates, 1; :::T; N paths of stock prices and short-term interest rates are simulated. The probability estimated at time 0 of retiring before time k, k could be any time between 1 and T; can be computed as follows.
Let r i denote the optimal retirement time for path i; i = 1; 2; :::; N . Let H be a N T matrix, where the rows correspond to the simulated paths and the columns correspond to time. The matrix H records the optimal retirement decisions of the individual. If H(i; j) = 1, j is the optimal retirement time for path i; otherwise, j is not the optimal retirement time for path i; that is,
By construction, there will be only one "1" in each row.
From the optimal decision matrix, H; we can derive an estimator of the probability of retiring before and including time k; k > 0: The notation, P R
OptionM odel 0
; denotes the retirement probability and
At time 0, the probability that the individual will retire before and including time k is the percentage of the paths where the optimal retirement times occur no later than time k: This probability is referred to as the retirement likelihood measure.
Summary of Section 4
This section provides a solution methodology to the model described in Section 3. N paths are simulated for the future stock prices and interest rates. It is assumed that the retirement option can only be exercised and considered at a …nite number of discrete times. At each path and for each possible retirement time, the optimal annuitization time and the optimal DC bene…t are computed using the LSM algorithm. After that, the LSM algorithm is applied again to …nd the optimal retirement time in each path. The percentage of the paths where the optimal retirement time occurs before and including time k is considered as an estimator of an individual's actual probability of retiring before and including time k:
V Application to the Retirement Decision in the U.K.
A forward-looking retirement likelihood measure was developed in Section 3 and 4. In this section, this likelihood measure will be tested empirically. This empirical investigation is based on data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). [Please Insert Table 1 Here]
Data
In this sample, 29 persons retired by the wave 2 interviews of ELSA. None of the 29 persons report that their main reason of retirement is due to the sickness of themselves or their family members. 69.5% of the individuals are contracted out which means that they cannot get retirement income from the second pillar state pensions (SERPS and S2P). In addition to the DC schemes, 31.27% of the individuals in the sample also have past DB plans and 11% of the individuals have current DB plans.
Our sample consists of 374 men and 144 women. 18.3% of the individuals have higher education or equivalent degrees. 30.5% of them didn't receive high school education. The summary statistics of the DC plan participants'age, gross income, DC wealth, asset income, bene…t income, gross household wealth and debt are presented in table 2. The average age of the sample members is 55. The average annual gross income is about $24; 400 and the average DC wealth is $33; 122: Overall, the size of the average DC plan is small compared with the gross income. The small size could be caused by the short contribution records and the contributions to parallel pension plans, for example, DB plans and SERPS. DC pension plans started widely in the U.K. in the 1990's, which means that the individuals in our sample started to contribute to the DC plan in their 40's. Asset income, bene…t income, gross household wealth excluding the primary housing and debt are at household level. Asset income consists of interest income, dividend income and the rent from second house, etc. Bene…t income refers to state bene…ts, for example, Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG), Child Bene…t and Disable Bene…t. Gross household wealth is the household's overall wealth excluding the house where they live.
[Please Insert Table 2 Here] The short rate, the bond yield and stock index used in this paper are the U.K. 3-month Treasury Bill rate, the U.K. 10-Year Government Bond yield and the FTSE All Share Index obtained from Datastream covering the period from Jan. 1984 to Dec. 2002 on quarterly basis. The summary statistics for these variables are provided in table 3. The mean of the yield on the 10-year zero-coupon U.K. government bond is on average 8.22%. The mean of the return of stock indices is 9.55%. The mean of the short rate is 8.13% which is very high compared with the 10-year zero-coupon yield and the return on stock index.
[Please Insert Table 3 Here] I use the Euler-Maruyama method to discretize di¤usion processes of the short rate, stock index and bond price. The parameters of these di¤usion processes are estimated from the U.K. data discussed above on quarterly frequency. The estimation method is introduced brie ‡y in Appendix C. The estimation results are as follows, r = 0:0232; r = 0:0129; r = 0:0019; s = 0:0367; s = 0:0911 and r = 0:1117:
Projected Annual Incomes
Information on past and future gross incomes is necessary to calculate the state pension and the DB pension income. The past and future gross income is projected based on the following variables: a gender dummy, experience which is de…ned as current age less the age the individual started to work divided by 10, dummies for education degrees and years of schooling. The (log) current gross annual income is regressed on the above mentioned variables and the square term of experience. The sample for testing the retirement likelihood measure consists of 518 individuals who work full time and have DC plans with complete information. But this analysis is based on the 1659 individuals who are working full time as reported at wave 1 interviews in order to make the projection more precise. The regression results are presented in table 4.
[Please Insert Table 4 Here]
The regression results show that female workers earn signi…cantly less than male workers. Individuals with high education degree (higher education degree or equivalent) earn signi…cantly more than individuals with low (lower than high school degree) and medium education (high school degree) degrees. Income also increases with years of schooling. Experience and its square term have correct signs but they are both insigni…cant which could due to the fact that the individuals in the sample are of similar age.
In this paper the in ‡ation rate, ; is assumed to be constant at 2% level. The projected past or future labor incomes for individual i, Y projected ; is
where F i is the individual i's current age, stands for individual i's future age, > F i ; or past age, < F i ; and EY ( ) i denote the projected labor income of individual i at wave 1 interviews if he is years old at that time which is derived from the regression reported in table 4.
BSP and SERPS
The amount of state pension the individuals can receive depends on, among others, whether they are contracted out or in and how long they have contributed to the state pension. The individual cannot receive their state pension until his State Pension Age is reached. If the individual delays receiving the state pension, the amount of pension is increased, at present, by approximately 7.5 per cent per year of delay in return. The maximum reward for deferment is 37 per cent, which is achieved by deferring for …ve years.
For the individuals who contracted out (in) in the wave 1, I assume that they contracted out (in) throughout their working life. Before 2002, the second pillar state pension is called SERPS. After 2002, the SERPS is replaced by S2P. But since S2P is only introduced in 2002, the individuals'contribution records to S2P are very short. Therefore, this reform does not have big impact on the individuals' pension income at 2004. Thus, in this paper, this reform is ignored. Department of Work and Pensions (2005) gives a very detailed description about the calculation of BSP and SERPS income which is adopted for the calculation of state pension in this paper.
The Estimated Retirement Probability
It is assumed that the interviews of wave 1 are conducted at the end of 2002 and the interviews of wave 2 are conducted at the end of 2004. For the individuals who are reported to be retired at wave 2 interviews, the exact retirement years are not known. Based on the information available at wave 1 interviews, the probabilities of retiring by wave 2 interviews, P R ; is set to 0:02; the risk aversion parameter, ; is 5; and the preference for leisure; K; equals to 1:5 in speci…cation 1. In speci…cation 2, for the individuals with DC wealth less than $150; 000; K equals to The load factor in the annuity price calculation (8) is assumed to be 0.2. The mortality rates are obtained from the U.K. Government Actuary's Department (GAD). The maximum age an individuals can live is assumed to be 100. Table 5 reports actual and average predicted percentage of the individuals who retire during 2003 and 2004 for the whole sample (518 individuals) and two subsamples. Subsample 1 consists of the individuals who retired at wave 2 and Subsample 2 consists of the individuals who were not yet retired at wave 2. The actual percentage of retirement is 5.6%. The predicted percentage of retirement is 3.91% for speci…cation 1 and 3.29% for speci…cation 2. The predicted percentage of retirement for the subsample 1 is 11.93% for speci…cation 1 and 19.64% for speci…cation 2. For subsample 2, the predicted percentage of retirement is 3.44% of speci…cation 1 and 2.32% for speci…cation 2.
[Please Insert Table 5 Here]
The Proxy of Retirement Incentive
In order to check whether the retirement likelihood measure, P R
OptionM odel 2002
; is signi…cant in explaining and predicting the retirement decision making in reality, the retirement likelihood measure is treated as a proxy for retirement incentives. A Probit analysis is applied to test the signi…cance of this proxy. The dependent variable is the sample individuals' retirement decisions reported at wave 2 interviews which takes value 1 if the individual is reported to be retired and 0 if not. The variables, Asset Income (AI), Bene…t Income (BI), Gross Household Wealth (GH) and Debt, which are not used for calculating P R
are also included in the analysis. The results are presented in table 6. For both leisure parameter speci…cations, the proxy of retirement incentives,
P R

OptionM odel 2002
; is positive and signi…cant at 5% level no matter whether the other four variables are included or not. This analysis shows that the retirement likelihood has signi…cant explanatory power in explaining and predicting the retirement decision in reality. It also means that …nancial incentives are important to the DC plan participants when they are making their retirement decision.
[Please Insert Table 6 Here]
The Model Fit
The model …t is analyzed by comparing the actual retirement probability at wave 2 interviews, the predicted retirement probability from the option model based on wave 1 interview information, P R
OptionM odel 2002
; and the predicted retirement probability from a Probit model, P R Pr obit 2002 ; where the regressors are variables such as, age, gender, education dummies, gross income and DC wealth, which are used for evaluating the retirement likelihood measure P R
and the dependent variable is the retirement decision at wave 2. The probability of retiring by wave 2 interviews computed from this Probit model is actually an in-sample prediction. By contrast, the prediction from the option model is out of sample.
[Please Insert Table 7 Here]
The probit regression reported in table 7 shows the impact of these variables on the individuals'retirement decision in the sample. The results are very intuitive. Older individuals are signi…cantly more likely to retire than younger ones. Women are signi…cantly more likely to retire than men. This is because in the U.K., the State Pension Age for women at 2002 is lower than that for men. Age and gender are signi…cant at 5% level. DC wealth, gross income and education dummies have expected signs, but they are insigni…cant. From the Probit model in table 7, for each individual we can compute the (in-sample) probability of retiring by wave 2 interviews, P R Pr obit
:
As in Stock and Wise (1990) , I divide the sample into several age groups and then compare the actual retirement ratio in each age group with the predictions from the option model, P R
OptionM odel 2002
; and from the Probit model, P R Pr obit
2002
. The results are shown in table 8 and …gure 1. It can be seen from …gure 1, that the actual retirement probability increases with age. The predictions from the option model catches this trend very well especially the one from speci…cation 2. The correlations between the option model probabilities and the actual retirement probabilities are 0.92 for model speci…cation 1 (K = 1:5) and 0.96 for model speci…cation 2 (K = Probit model probabilities and the actual probabilities is 0.94. Furthermore, the option model probabilities from model speci…cation 2 have roughly the same Mean Square Errors (MSEs) as those from the Probit analysis. The MSEs of these two predictions are almost zero. The MSE for option model speci…cation 1 is 1% larger.
[Please Insert Table 8 and Figure 1 Here]
The sample was also divided by the DC wealth level. Level 1 includes the individuals with DC wealth smaller than $5; 000: Level 2 includes individuals with DC wealth larger than $5; 000 but smaller than $10; 000 and so on until level 7 which is the highest level and includes the individuals with DC wealth larger than or equal to $150; 000: The results are reported in table 9 and …gure 2. Overall, the actual retirement probability is increasing with the DC wealth level. The correlation coe¢ cient between the actual retirement ratio (column 2 in table 9) and the predicted retirement ratio from the Probit model is 0.78. The correlation coe¢ cient between the actual retirement ratio and the predicted retirement ratios from the option models are about 0.48 for speci…cation 1 and 0.67 for speci…cation 2. The MSEs of the Probit model and option model prediction 2 are close to 0. The MSE of option model speci…cation 1 is 2% larger.
[Please Insert Table 9 and Figure 2 Here] Generally speaking, the performance of the option model, especially using the model speci…cation where the leisure parameter is age dependent, in terms of correlations with the actual retirement probabilities and Mean Square Errors, are comparable to the performance of the in-sample Probit predictions.
Summary of Section 5
Section 5 provides an empirical analysis to the retirement likelihood measure. ELSA data is adopted for this analysis. For each individual in the sample, the probability that he will retire before wave 2 interviews is evaluated based on the information available at wave 1 interviews. Model predictions are compared with actual retirement decisions and in-sample predictions from a Probit model where age, gender, DC wealth, gross income and education levels are used to explain the retirement decision by wave 2 interviews. The performances of option model predictions are comparable to the performances of the in-sample Probit predictions.
VI Conclusions
This paper analyzed the retirement and annuitization timing decisions of DC pension plan members. This paper …rst developed a retirement likelihood which takes into account the optimal annuitization timing decision and then tested it empirically. The retirement likelihood measure describes the probability that an individual will retire within the next years. This measure is applied to ELSA data. Based on information available at ELSA wave 1 interviews, for each individual in the sample, the likelihood of retirement before wave 2 interviews are computed.
The result of the Probit analysis, where the retirement likelihood measure is treated as a proxy for retirement incentive, show that it is positive and signi…cant at 5% level in explaining the future retirement decision. The retirement likelihood measure is then compared with the actual retirement decisions and the in-sample predictions from a Probit regression which uses age, gender, education and DC wealth as explanatory variables. The performance of the retirement likelihood measure is comparable to the performance of the Probit regression, even though the predictions from the option model are out of sample while the predictions from the Probit regression are in sample.
It can be concluded that the retirement likelihood measure which takes into account the optimal annuitization timing decision has strong predictive power for the actual retirement timing decisions. This result suggest that in reality at least some individuals recognize the value of the freedom in choosing the annuitization time and take it into account when making their retirement decisions.
Appendix C: The Parameter Estimation
In this subsection, the parameters of the di¤usion processes, (2), (3) and (6), will be estimated. The Euler-Maruyama method is used to derive the discrete-time approximations of these di¤usion processes. For the short term interest rate, the discrete-time approximation is r t+ t r t = r (r r t ) t + u r;t+ t ;
r t+ t = + r r t + u r;t+ t ;
where the error term, u r;t+ t = r Z 1 with Z 1 = Z 1;t+ t Z 1;t ; is normal distributed with E t (u r;t+ t ) = 0;
= r r t and r = 1 r t: The discrete-time approximation of the stock index is
where the error term, u s;t+ t = s S t Z 2 with Z 2 = Z 2;t+ t Z 2;t ; has the properties
and s = 1+ s s t: The distribution of the excess return on stock index can be approximated by a normal distribution with mean s s t and variance 2 s t: For this estimation, t is taken to be 1, referring to 1 quarter of a year.
The estimation of the AR(1) model (24) is presented in table 10. The AR(1) term of the short rate, r ; is signi…cant at 1% level. From the estimation reported in table 3, we can get r = 0:0232 and r = 0:0129: The volatility of the short rate, r ; is derived from the residuals of the two AR(1) process and r = 0:0019. The price of risk for stock index and the volatility of stock index are estimated from the distribution of excess return of stock index. We have s = 0:0367 and s = 0:0911:
Let the yield of a 10-year zero-coupon government bond derived from Vasicek model beŶ t , which is a function of r and let Y t stands for the yield in the data sample. r is estimated by minimizing the objective function, F ( r ) ;
The price of risk for short-term interest rate, r ; is 0:1117. is the prediction from the option model described in section 4. In the option model, there are two specifications for the leisure parameter, K. In specification 1, the disutility of work parameter K is a constant which equals to 1.5. In specification 2, is the prediction from the option model described in section 4. Group 1 are the individuals with DC wealth less than <£5,000, Group 2 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £5,000 and £10,000, Group 3 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £10,000 and £25,000, Group 4 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £25,000 and £50,000, Group 5 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £50,000 and £100,000, Group 6 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £100,000 and £150,000, and Group 7 includes the individuals with DC wealth larger or equal to £150,000. Average and Predicted Retirement Ratio By Wealth Groups actual retirement probability option model probability, specification 1 Probit model probability option model probability, specification 2
